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BUILDING ANTITRUST AGENCY CAPACITY IN 
CONTEXT 
Salil Mehra* 
Since the early 1990s, the world has seen the establishment of compre-
hensive antitrust regimes in the Eastern European transitional economies,1 
Latin America,2 China,3 and India.4  The growth of new and revitalized anti-
trust regimes around the world has focused attention on how to build effec-
tive and helpful competition law institutions.  In many respects, this is a 
novel challenge because the need and impulse for antitrust had previously 
been associated with mature market economies.5  Technical assistance as 
currently supplied in the world predominantly takes the form of experts 
from senior antitrust institutions in developed countries making recommen-
dations to new or newer antitrust regimes in emerging economies.6  Because 
of the incongruity of this fit, technical assistance may be aimed at the prob-
lems it seeks to find, rather than the most pressing problems. 
This brief Essay provides some context to understand why the transfer 
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emerging enforcement institutions elsewhere will likely not be a simple ex-
ercise.  A technocratic model of antitrust law suits the context of the United 
States because of the wide consensus on the goals of antitrust policy in the 
U.S.7  But emerging antitrust regimes may not have the benefit of the same 
underlying consensus on methods and goals that American enforcers enjoy.  
As a result, technical assistance focusing on narrow questions of interpreta-
tion may elide difficult questions of first principles and institutional design 
in emerging antitrust regimes. 
The descriptive statistics that Professor Sokol provides can help shed 
light on common problems with how technical assistance is provided to 
emerging antitrust regimes.8  However, as shown by the examples I will 
discuss, the focus on forms of technical assistance in isolation may lead to 
the inaccurate view that emerging antitrust regimes are part of a sterilized 
environment in which other issues of enforcement authority and state power 
in markets can be controlled.  In fact, reforming or emerging antitrust re-
gimes may confront difficult—and contested—issues involving both the 
methods and institutions of competition law (―rules‖ of the game in Sokol‘s 
terms) and their application to achieve goals in specific cases (―play‖ of the 
game).  Part I of this Essay sets forth an example of how competition law 
may involve different, intertwined goals, Part II provides an example of 
how competition law can hinge on the nature of enforcement authority, and 
Part III considers Professor Sokol‘s findings in light of these issues. 
I. COMPETITION LAW AND DIVERGENT GOALS 
Divergent goals may complicate the spread of antitrust ―best practices‖ 
through technical assistance.  Ultimately, this will affect the ―play‖ of the 
game by altering the choices that regulators make as they apply competition 
law to particular cases.  As an example, American antitrust lawyers often 
confront foreign competition regimes that include provisions not only for 
the protection of consumer welfare—familiar in the U.S. as the touchstone 
of antitrust—but also for market integration.  Competition regimes such as 
that of the European Union and the People‘s Republic of China require that 
their antitrust enforcers consider implications for the reduction of internal 
barriers to free trade.9  Often, these barriers stem from protectionist 
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American antitrust lawyers often characterize these aims as being 
somewhat distinct from that of traditional antitrust policy.  However, that 
view embraces a very narrow American—and lawyerly—sense of what 
competition law should include.  In the U.S., the problem of local 
protection at the state level has been handled through litigation under the 
Commerce Clause for more than 150 years.10  And it has been handled 
largely independently from the consumer-welfare based, private-restraint 
focused antitrust laws.  As a result, an American antitrust lawyer perceives 
attempts to reduce internal market barriers as foreign to antitrust because 
they are foreign to her conception of antitrust. 
For example, for a nation such as China engaged in its third decade of 
economic liberalization (gaige kaifang, or ―reform and opening up‖), the 
use of competition law to take down internal barriers may reflect the 
attempt to take on a difficult political and economic problem by 
piggybacking on the momentum for liberalization.11  The need to promote 
economic reform with the help of local governments, along with attempts to 
reduce the central government‘s revenue assistance to them, led to the 
creation of what has been referred to as the ―local developmental state.‖  
This has in turn fostered ―administrative monopolies‖ that are essentially 
lower-level government restraints on trade.  Such results can be difficult to 
disentangle given their political and economic logic for those involved; the 
attempt to address them with antitrust law may reflect the hope of sweeping 
them up within a larger drive for liberalization. 
The inclusion of goals such as internal market liberalization may seem 
to accentuate tension between goals of static and dynamic efficiency.  On 
the one hand, traditional antitrust policy as effected in the United States 
aims to reduce private restraints and immediately eliminate deadweight 
loss.  While policies aimed at reducing internal barriers to trade also reduce 
deadweight loss, their larger goal is more long-term.  They seek economies 
of scale by enlarging producers‘ available market.  And by doing so, such 
policies hope to improve growth over time.  But their goal is not merely 
economic.  These policies also aim to alter the degree to which politics 
distorts markets.  As such, the tensions they involve are difficult to measure 
using a conventional antitrust lens. 
II. REGULATORY FIRST PRINCIPLES 
Institutional design and fit within a political and economic system will 
also complicate the adoption of ―best practices‖ through technical assis-
tance—these ―rules of the game‖ issues can influence how and whether 
these practices get adopted.  An antitrust enforcement agency is at base a 
government actor.  As such, its ability to conform behavior depends crucial-
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An example concerning the adoption of merger review guidelines by 
Japan‘s Fair Trade Commission in the early 1990s may illustrate this point.  
While Japan has been a developed nation for some time, it has not had a 
history of vigorous antitrust enforcement.  Until recently, it had failed to 
adopt a set of merger guidelines similar to the concentration-based (HHI)12 
standards used in and spread by the U.S. since 1982.13  But this failure may 
be easier to understand by thinking about what such formal guidelines can 
mean in a system where the nature of regulators‘ authority may be different 
in degree or kind.  Where regulators wield wide discretion, something like 
the merger guidelines restrains them.  And where they derive authority from 
the perception that they are smart and efficient, giving up discretion by 
making credible commitments may not necessarily enhance the perception 
of their authority in the short run.  Thus, Japanese officials may not have 
been as sanguine about adopting guidelines like the U.S. merger guidelines 
because of the inherent tension with their own authority. 
Consider the Small but Significant and Nontransitory Increase in Price 
(SSNIP) test in merger review.14  Since the 1982 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, SSNIP has become well established in U.S. antitrust 
enforcement, and the U.S. advocates its adoption for emerging antitrust 
regimes.  From an American viewpoint, this is all pretty uncontroversial.  
Indeed, as a method of gauging market power, SSNIP has also become well 
accepted in many emerging antitrust regimes.15 
That said, as with any attempt to impose a rule or test in place of 
discretion, SSNIP creates the possibility of false negatives and false 
positives.16  That is, predictability has a trade-off with an idealized ―perfect 
regulatory result.‖  Of course, this objection can be answered with the point 
that whether one adopts SSNIP or not, one is trading off between two 





  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) provides a measure of the concentration level within an 
industry.  See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM‘N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.5 
[hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES] (rev. ed. 1997), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm (link). 
13
  See Salil Mehra, Same Plant, Different Soil: Japan’s New Merger Guidelines, 26 NW. J. INT‘L L. 
& BUS. 515 (2006). 
14
  See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 12 § 1.11. 
15
  See, e.g., Robert Lipschitz, Paul Anderson & Fatima Fiandeiro, Self-supply and Indirect Con-
straints Within Competition Analysis, G:ENESIS May 22, 2008, at 1 available at 
http://web.wits.ac.za/NR/rdonlyres/2372FFD6-0558-4478-82A1-6B3930BDC413/0/ 
Fiandeiro_Selfsupply_indirect_constraints_22May2008.pdf (―In most competition cases, the basic me-
thodological approach used to define markets and determine market power is relatively uncontroversial.  
Markets are defined based on the SSNIP (Small but Significant Nontransitory Increase in Price) test and 
market power is measured using a range of factors such as market share, barriers to entry and counter-
vailing buying power.‖) (link).  
16
  This is based on discussions about SSNIP that the author has had with antitrust enforcers in Ja-
pan. 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/5/ 314 
times.17  Additionally, there is Judge Easterbrook‘s insight that the harms 
from permissive errors are more likely than punishment errors to resolve 
themselves.18 
While such arguments make good sense in our system, they may not 
apply well to regulators whose authority relies more on persuasive force 
than does the DOJ or the FTC.19  If a foreign competition authority‘s power 
relies on the perception that it is an elite body that does not make mistakes, 
they may perceive a test like SSNIP differently.  Specifically, the gain in 
predictability may come at the cost of binding itself in ways that undercut 
its aura of authority.  Thus, there is a meta-analysis above competition 
policy that involves the source of institutional power; tradeoffs at that level 
may complicate certain reforms. 
III. REVIEWING ANTITRUST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
In light of these divergences between competition law considerations 
in the United States and elsewhere, we might expect to find a corresponding 
impact on how well technical assistance works, given the possible tensions 
with the recipient‘s domestic context.  Professor Sokol‘s statistical findings 
support this conclusion.  Indeed, what might appear at first to be a contra-
diction—that recipients prefer lawyers in some cases but economists in oth-
ers—may instead in fact be quite rational, given the varying range of 
problems covered by different nations‘ competition laws. 
Specifically, Professor Sokol focuses on comparisons between two dif-
ferent kinds of assistance, long-term technical assistance and short-term in-
tervention, and two different kinds of technical assistance providers, 
economists and lawyers.  His survey data shows that the personnel at 
emerging antitrust regimes prefer long-term assistance to short-term assis-
tance.  Further, they prefer that economists (rather than lawyers) provide 
long-term assistance, but that lawyers (rather than economists) provide 
short-term intervention.  At first blush, one might wonder why the enforce-
ment officials at emerging antitrust regimes do not always prefer one group 
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Seen in context, however, these findings make sense.  Consider our 
first example, representing the idea that emerging antitrust regimes often go 
beyond the U.S. approach by addressing problems such as regional and lo-
cal government restraints with their antitrust laws.  A short-term interven-
tion is more likely to focus on a discrete problem in developing and 
prosecuting a case.  But long-term assistance allows for consideration of a 
wider range of issues, and, while lawyers focus on individual matters, 
economists are trained in a method.  Consequently, for an emerging anti-
trust regime whose bailiwick includes not only merger review and cartel en-
forcement, but also regulation of local government barriers to trade, an 
economist may be better suited to provide long-term help. 
By contrast, with their narrower focus on process and cases, lawyers 
may be more appropriate to deal with discrete issues that do not reach wider 
questions of institutional design and the scope of competition law.  Sokol‘s 
finding that emerging antitrust regimes prefer lawyers for technical assis-
tance in the form of short-term intervention comports with this understand-
ing of lawyers‘ roles.  Indeed, his data suggest that almost half of short-term 
interventions in his data set involve abuse of dominance issues—an area 
that, while not characterized by universal agreement, nonetheless is a core 
area of coverage in most antitrust regimes.  That combination of difficulty 
of application and consensus on its appropriateness for antitrust treatment 
seems a good fit for the strengths and weaknesses we might expect of law-
yers relative to economists. 
IV. TWO PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION 
Sokol‘s work, including a forthcoming piece with Professors Nichol-
son and Stiegert that presents a model of technical assistance,20 represents a 
useful contribution in an area sadly lacking in empirical study.  After all, 
significant sums of money are spent on technical assistance.  Consequently, 
it is sobering to think how little evidence there is about what works and 
what does not. 
That said, I suggest two proposals to consider when going forward 
with these studies, one focused on substance and the other on process.  The 
substantive critique focuses on as substantive a topic as there is: money.  
All things being equal, short-term assistance ought to cost less than long-
term assistance.21  The question that remains then is whether the marginal 
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short-term assistance.  We often prefer expensive things to cheap things in 
an absolute sense, but buy the cheap thing based on our perception of the 
price/performance ratio.  Thus, future studies should address the 
cost/benefit impact of short-term intervention and long-term assistance. 
The procedural critique focuses on the concept of who ―seeks‖ or ―con-
trols‖ the technical assistance project, the sender or the receiver.  Sokol ad-
dresses this question, which is important to his conclusion about how to 
maximize the usefulness of technical assistance to its recipient.  But in fact, 
this is a really difficult problem.  After all, just as people might tell you 
what they think you want to hear, donors and recipients may both try to an-
ticipate each other‘s wishes.  Decoding which side supplied the impetus for 
a technical assistance project may be quite difficult after the fact.  How to 
best structure the process by which technical assistance projects are nego-
tiated so that the range of options for assistance is widened—and so that 
each competition agency‘s perceptions of the other are made more accurate 
and transparent—is a question that deserves serious consideration.  For ex-
ample, it may be worth thinking about how to make it more likely that reci-
pients will contemplate types of assistance that do not just mirror the 
functions of developed nations‘ antitrust agencies, but also reflect the con-
text in which their competition regimes are emerging.  By improving the 
process, it may be possible to reduce the likelihood of sending poorly-fitted 
assistance. 
CONCLUSION 
Competition law technical assistance has become widespread both as 
development assistance and as a means for confidence-building among the 
world‘s competition law agencies.  Technical assistance, however, will tend 
to face problems of divergence that at base lie with the design and coverage 
of different competition law regimes.  These divergences may help explain 
some of Professor Sokol‘s findings, and studies such as his are helpful in 
promoting a better transition to a world full of competition law regimes.  
Further work could focus on refinements concerning how technical assis-
tance projects are designed and evaluated. 
